

THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL CULTURE IN MULTI-ETHNIC MALAYSIA

Qasim Ahmad

Introduction

Present day Federation of Malaysia consists of eleven states in its Western part and two big ones in the Eastern. West Malaysia (approximately 132,000 square kilometres in size) is a peninsular jutting out from the south portion of Thailand with the Straits of Malacca to its West, the South China Sea to its east and the Singapore Island to its south. East Malaysia (200,000 square kilometres), occupying a significant part of the land mass of the island of Borneo, is separated from West Malaysia by an about 500 kilometre stretch of the South China Sea. Here Malaysia shares common land borders with Indonesia and Brunei while the Philippines lies not too far north from Sabah (one of the two Eastern states, the other being Sarawak) across the Sulu Sea.

The country's close to 20 million populations is visibly multiethnic. It comprises of the indigenous people: mainly Malays in West Malaysia, Kadazan, Dusun and Bajau in Sabah and Iban, Melanau and Dayak in Sarawak; and the non-indigenous minority of mainly Chinese and Indians. It is also a multireligious country with the Malays professing Islam, a large proportion and the indigenous population in Sabah and Sarawak Christianity, the Chinese, by and large, Buddhism or Confucianism and the Indians Hinduism mainly. The 1991 population census indicates that the indigenous people make up 60.6% of the entire populace with the rest taking up the remaining 39.4%.

In the past, the historically significant parts of Malaysia were no stranger to multiculturalism or cosmopolitanism. Malacca, the prosperous 15th century sultanate or empire - so prosperous that the Portuguese chronicler, Tome Pires wrote in his *Suma Oriental* that 'Whoever is lord of Malacca has his hand on the throat of Venice'⁽¹⁾ - welcomed to its shores traders from far and wide, including those from China, India, the Arab land, Persia, Burma and Siam.⁽²⁾ It was also said that, again citing Tome Pires' work as the source, for the purpose of business transactions, eighty odd languages were spoken at the port of Malacca.⁽³⁾ While Malacca was the centre for Centerport trade in the Malay

Peninsula, Brunei exercised a similar role further east on the island of Borneo. Both Sabah and Sarawak were parts of the Brunei Sultanate before the coming of British colonialism in the course of the nineteenth century.⁽⁴⁾ And their eventual teaming up with Malaya (and Singapore) to form Malaysia in 1963.

Malacca was founded in the first decade of the fifteenth century by a Hindu Prince by the name of Parameswara. However, very early after the founding of the Sultanate, the Malacca Court, and later the entire populace, embraced Islam. Subsequently, Malacca became a centre from which Islam spread to the neighbouring lands. Their adherence to the new faith notwithstanding, the Malays of Malacca did retain certain aspects of the culture of their former belief, Hinduism; many of the cultural practices were, no doubt, modified somewhat so as not to run counter to the spirit and strictures of Islam.

Incidentally it was the Muslim traders from India, Gujarat to be specific, who played a crucial initial role in the Islamization of Malacca. Added to that, certain Indian Muslim personalities were later to attain some high ranking positions in the administrative machinery of the state. All this ensured the continuation of a lasting influence of the Indian community or elements in Malaysian life.

Besides the Indian connection, Malacca too had had trade and high-level official relations with China. As in the case with the Indian-Malay ties, the Sino-Malay encounters had also resulted in the interchange of cultural mores across the racial divide. The most symbolic gesture denoting the merging of the two cultures perhaps was the marriage of Sultan Mansor Shah to a Chinese (Muslim) lady named Hang Li Po.⁽⁵⁾ It's most lasting and visible testimony, however, is the coming into being, and its survival to this very day, of the *baba* community whose 'language is a somewhat "signified" Malay dialect and ... culture a mixture of both Chinese and Malay'.⁽⁶⁾

The infusion of Indian and Chinese cultural elements into Malay culture no doubt indicates the nature and the extent of the receptiveness of the latter. For some, this in itself strengthens the idea of making Malay culture the foundation for a national or Malaysian culture. In other words, the multicultural antecedents within the Malay culture

can be utilised, and justifiably so, to provide the basis for the country's modern national culture. Presumably too, the historical precedent opens the way for other present and future symbiosis amongst the diverse cultural traditions within the country, bearing in mind that culture is seldom a static phenomenon.

The above reasoning, to be sure, is not the only, nor necessarily the most cogent one, that can be marshalled in support of making Malay culture the basis of a Malaysian culture. Other reasons have also been put forward. It has, for instance, been argued that the Malay culture, unlike that of the Chinese and Indian, is indigenous to the Southeast Asian region that envelops Malaysia within it.⁽⁷⁾ It sits well in the context of surrounding cultural environment. With the exception of Thailand and modern day Singapore, Malaysia's neighbours, i.e. Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines are all nations belonging to the Malay stock, the fact that the majority of the Filipinos are Christians notwithstanding. The non-Malay aspect Singapore's cultural identity is, historically speaking, a very recent factor.⁽⁸⁾ It is no accident, perhaps, that the founding father of the young republic has decided to accept Malay as the national language of the city-state. Then again, like Thailand, Singapore has a significant Malay minority in her population make up.

Yet another consideration, perhaps even more compelling in the eyes of some, for making Malay culture the under planning premise of Malaysia's national culture resides in certain particular aspects of the constitutional arrangement that have been agreed upon the respective representatives of the various ethnic groupings at the time when the Federation of Malaya gained independence from the British, i.e. in 1997. By that time the British had already colonised Malaya for well over eighty years and had brought in a large pool of Chinese labourers to work the tin mines and Indians the rubber plantations. The proportion of this foreign community to the native one was far larger than the one witnessed in ancient Malacca. The societal make up was also more complex, what with the fledging modern economy, the school system already in place and a communication network covering almost the entire place, even though still relatively primitive in many respects. By and large the twentieth century Chinese and Indian communities in Malaya, unlike their ancestors in old Malacca, were more persuaded, or committed, to settle down in the new land. Furthermore, their population size too was far larger than the

sixteenth century one.

Insisting that Independent Malaya be bequeathed to a multiracial government and populace, the departing British thus played no small part in ensuring that the Chinese and Indians in the country-then would eventually gain their Malayan citizenship. Citizens they were made, on the basis of the *jus soli* principle. As a *quid pro quo*, the Malays secured a constitutional guarantee whereby they are accorded with Special Privileges. With Special Privileges as embodied in Article 153 of the Federal Constitution the Malays, and later the natives of the Borneo States as well, have access to certain state aids in economic, educational and other matters. The idea was to ensure that they were not going to be simply submerged in the post independent economic and political life of the country submerged by the mostly urban dwelling, and because of a host of historical and other reasons, relatively more advanced non-Malay communities. In the constitutional package deal that was finally struck, it was also agreed that Malay be made the national language of independent Malaya. This was provided for in Article 152 of the Federal constitution.⁽⁹⁾

It is perhaps safe to say that, by any reckoning, language is a crucial part of culture; hence national language of national culture. Culture, to go by a definition and one that can well serve the purpose of our present discussion, is 'the complete social heritage and way of life of a society or group of people.'⁽¹⁰⁾ In that 'complete... way of life' the place of language, needless to say, can never be in any way discarded. The more numerous common cultural elements there are in any given society, the more cohesive, hopefully, that particular society would be.

For a multi-ethnic country like Malaysia an over-arching rallying point, one that could be readily identified and claimed by all, symbolic or otherwise, would certainly help in fostering cohesiveness, unity and stability. It is in this sense that the role of a common or national language ought to be viewed. If provides a bridging up element, a convenient cross ethnic communication tool thus, in fact, rendering it to be more than just symbolic. Given that the presence of certain shared attributes, natural or nurtured, can presumably

foster a better degree of mutual understanding and a heightened sense of solidarity, the social advantage or usefulness of having a national language, therefore, could hardly be overestimated.

The need for better understanding and improved solidarity amongst the various ethnic groups in Malaysia was sorely felt by the nation after the tragic outbreak of civil and racial strife in May 1969, the aftermath of a keenly contested General Election. As a result, normal democratic life of the country was briefly suspended and national leaders set themselves the task of addressing the problem and finding ways of preventing its recurrence.

The immediate prescription handed down to the nation, it is true, was an economic one, but the language question was very much intertwined with it. It is in this scenario, it may well be argued, that the cultural implications or considerations should be placed. The timing of the events, as would be readily observed, indeed tends to suggest this.

The economic policy formulated in the immediate post 1969 crisis was the New Economic Policy (NEP). The economic imbalance, meaning the relative economic backwardness of the indigenous groups *visa-a-vis* the non-indigenous ones, in particular the Chinese, was held to be inimical towards racial harmony and national integration. Being economically marginalised or outpaced, it was thus understandable if the indigenous people, more specific the Malays in Peninsular Malaysia, felt doubly threatened when the non-Malays became somewhat vociferous and strident in celebrating their markedly improved electoral performance in 1969. This combination chasm and political tension or insecurity was then identified as the problem. As one Western scholar of Malaysian politics puts it

“After an extended post-mortem on the 1969 crisis the government eventually accepted the interpretation that the riots could be attributed to ethnic polarization and animosity heightened by the election campaign, but ultimately attributable to escalating Malay grievances over the failure of economic policies to redress the relative economic deprivation of the Malays as compared to the non-Malays.”⁽¹¹⁾

The twin objective of the New Economic policy was spelt out in the preamble to the **Second Malaysian Plan 1971-1975:**

“The first prong is to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, by raising income levels and increasing employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race. The second program aims at accelerating the process of restructuring Malaysian society to correct the economic imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function.”⁽¹²⁾

The restructuring of Malaysian society calls for, the Government believes the creation of a viable and robust Malay and indigenous commercial and industrial community. This will ensure that, as the Government puts it, the ‘Malays and other indigenous people will become full partners in all aspects of the economic life of the nation.’⁽¹³⁾

It is in connection with the effort towards making the Malays and other indigenous people ‘full partners in all aspects of the economic life of the nation’ that the role of Malay as the national language of the country was markedly emphasised in the post 1969 era. The provision for replacing English with Malay as the medium of instruction in government schools and other educational institutions, as stipulated in the Education Act, 1961, was to be faithfully implemented, albeit in a gradual manner. The language switch started with the 1970 Standard 1 (Primary 1) cohort of students. The process continued upwards, literally following the pioneer group of students as they move into higher grades year by year. Following this progressive implementation of the national language policy, all Malaysian students entering universities as freshies in 1983 came to be taught in the National Language. But in one university, the National University of Malaysia, this practice was realised much earlier. The students there began receiving their education in Malay in 1971, i.e. in the inception year of the university. This naturally ‘resulted in making available a far larger number of university places for students from the Malay medium schools.’⁽¹⁴⁾

While the implementation of Malay as the medium of instruction in public educational

institutions spelt obvious advantages to the Malays, the government, in fact, took further steps to ensure that Malay and indigenous students secure their fair share of places in the country's universities. Thus in 1971, Article 153 of the Constitution, i.e. the one guaranteeing Special Privileges to the indigenous population was submitted to Parliament for amendment; and the amendment was duly passed. The new enactment, which became Article 153 (8A), empowered His Majesty the King to direct universities to reserve a certain number of places for Malay and indigenous students in faculties where the number of successful Malay and indigenous applicants was found to be negligible. What this quota or positive discrimination system means is that the universities, in many instances, would have to admit indigenous candidates whose entry points are lower than some of those of the non indigenous applicants. In introducing this amendment to Parliament, the Prime Minister of the day, Tun Abdul Razak, made clear that it was part and parcel of the government New Economic Policy, aimed at, as was observed, restructuring society. The constitutional amendment has to be made, he said, as 'education ... has so directed a bearing on economic and social progress.'⁽¹⁵⁾ The end result was not just to redress economic imbalance but to 'contribute to national unity.'⁽¹⁶⁾

In trying to work out a kind of *modus Vivendi* between groups with conflicting interest, clear intent of even-handedness and discreet implementation is most crucial. Assurance of this was given by the ruling party with regard to the new education policy. The Prime Minister promised Parliament that the affirmative policy in favour of the indigenous students 'will be implemented with care.'⁽¹⁷⁾ Echoing this very same sentiment, the Minister of Finance, Tan Siew Sin, emphasised 'the intention [of the Government] to be fair and just to all communities, so that even though reservations are made for Malays, the non- Malays will still have their fair share of places in these courses of study'.⁽¹⁸⁾

This balancing act, of helping members of one community without harming or appearing to harm others outside it, is, in fact, a running or permanent theme in the inter-ethnic accommodation practised or aimed at in Malaysia. It is clearly observable in the Federal Constitution and in many other historic legislations and pronouncements made subsequently. Whenever and wherever indigenous mores are being championed those of the non-indigenous communities certainly, wily nily, have to be simultaneously handled

with circumspect. This requires tedious negotiations and delicate compromises. With regard to the final and mutual agreement arrived at on the eve of the country's independence way back in 1957, this whole series of *quid pro quo* was widely referred to as the 'historic bargain'. Hence, for instance, while Article 3(1) of the Federal Constitution upholds Islam as 'the religion of the Federation' it duly carries another qualifying statement: 'but other religions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation'. Later, the post May 1969 New Economic Policy was specifically launched to bolster the economic position of the indigenous population but, as already seen, it aspired to do so in the context of 'increasing employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race.'⁽¹⁹⁾ Similarly the national ideology, *Rukunegara*, formally promulgated in August 1971, has, as one of its expressed aims, the achievement of 'a greater unity' amongst all the peoples of Malaysia; but at the same time it easily concedes the need for 'a liberal approach' to her [Malaysia's] rich and diverse cultural traditions'.⁽²⁰⁾

How does one set out to formulate and realize a national culture given the country's 'rich and diverse cultural traditions'? The answer presumably lies in treading delicately along the line of accommodation and compromise spelt out above. Significantly then, it was in the same month and year (August 1971) that saw the promulgation of *Rukunegara*, that the government formulated the National Cultural Policy.⁽²¹⁾ The government, in agreement with a view already noted before this, laid down the principle that the National Culture Policy would be 'based on the culture of the indigenous people of the country and Islam would be an important element in the development of the national culture'⁽²²⁾ However, true to the accommodative spirit pictured above, the principle carries a clear and crucial rider: 'Relevant and appropriate elements from the cultures of other ethnic communities ought also be accepted as part of the National Culture'.⁽²³⁾

Trying to evaluate the extent of the implementation of the National Culture Policy is, admittedly, not as easy as trying to evaluate the one related to the national language policy. Nevertheless, all is not lost as one can at least look at the broadcasting policy adopted by Radio and Television Malaysia (RTM). As a government broadcasting agency RTM is expected to implement government policies and the National Culture Policy is one of

these. What better medium there is other than the TV for relaying national cultures into Malaysian homes for many of the TV programmes carry numerous and varied elements of culture either of the popular version or the more serious one. Through the popularization of national culture the government entertains the hope that national solidarity would be enhanced. After all a government spokesman told Parliament in early 1971 that the task of RTM was 'to ensure national solidarity in the context of *Rukunegara*.'⁽²⁴⁾ Taken in the context of RTM's broadcasting policy, what this meant was that programmes in Malay were then given newly injected emphasis. Naturally this had had an adverse effect on broadcasting time hitherto allocated to programmes produced in medium other than Malay. This development sparked criticisms from non-Malay opposition spokesmen in Parliament. Obviously in this immediate post 1969 the task of implementing the National Culture Policy was deemed necessary but by no means easy. The government could not possibly avoid the role of trying to balance the interest of a section of the community which was committed towards the upholding and public propagation of national culture, based upon or simply derived from Malay cultural norms, with those of other communities that obviously fear the erosion of their respective cultural traditions, erosion, that is, from within the public domain.

The distinction between the public domain and the private one in this discussion on culture is indeed pertinent. As defined, culture is all encompassing.⁽²⁵⁾ It touches on almost all aspects of an individual's life. However, not every single aspect of an individual's life could be moulded entirely by a public policy. Hence, for instance, displays of cultural activities may be available on the country's television screens but many an ordinary citizen might choose not to view the programmes concerned. In other words, a public policy has its own natural limitation. In this regard, the impact of the national language policy, presumably, would be more far reaching as all children (or almost all) in Malaysia go to school and they cannot choose not to learn Malay, the national language. It is true that what is learnt in schools does not necessarily obliterate what is practised in the homes. The Chinese or Indian schoolchildren, though very fluent in the national language would very likely revert back to conversing in their own respective mother tongues once they are in the confines of their own family members. The national language, like the national culture, cannot be guaranteed to penetrate all

Malaysian homes. As one Malaysian Chinese academician, now a member of the Dr. Mahatir's Cabinet puts it, 'when these Chinese children return home after school, they continue to use their respective Chinese dialects...' ⁽²⁶⁾ Therefore, to him, 'In all probability, the Chinese will still remain Chinese to all intents and purposes.'⁽²⁷⁾

Given the known parameter within which a public policy operates in a democratic set-up, it is inevitable that the National Culture Policy has to live with certain limitations. Like the National Language Policy, the National Culture Policy too cannot be expected to intrude into and transform every aspect of the private lives of individual Malaysians. Certainly that has not and cannot be the desired objective of the policy, the aspiration of cultural purists and idealists notwithstanding if indeed there ever was such an aspiration. Hence, as observed above, each public policy, be it the one related to language, culture, education or even religion, makes ample allowance for the private exercise of each citizen's individual rights. In other words, each citizen is entitled to his or her private indulgence in these spheres.

At this juncture it is perhaps worth recalling that the active pursuit of the National Culture Policy, like that of the National Language Policy, came in the wake of the May 1969 tragic civil strife that shook the nation from its slumber. As was explained, the tragedy impelled the country's policy makers to devise policies and strategies to overcome the jarring economic disparities between the major ethnic communities and the related, or resultant, sense of insecurity. Hence, to reiterate, the New Economic Policy was formulated as an answer. The National Culture Policy was by no means an economic instrument but it is useful to remember the context within which it was conceived. It was initiated and developed at a time when the nation badly needed meaningful rallying points. The National Culture Policy was one such device. Perhaps one can therefore hazard that, at a time when the indigenous community perceived itself as being hemmed in from almost all sides, it is understandable that it resorted to asserting the concept and practice of national culture, based, as was emphasised, on the indigenous mores of the country. Of course it can also be argued that it was in fact simply an emphasis of the rightful thing and had nothing to do with any compensatory mechanism whatsoever.

Whatever explanation is given to the contentious issue above, (there could well be others) one might now want to compare the current situation in Malaysia with the one that existed two decades ago when the National Culture Policy was first initiated. Throughout this period the government broadcasting agency, Radio and Television Malaysia (RTM), has consistently abided by its objectives, which, amongst others, include ‘to assist in fostering national unity in our multiracial society through the extensive use of *Bahasa Malaysia* [Malay],’ and ‘to assist in promoting civic consciousness and fostering the development of Malaysian arts and culture’.⁽²⁸⁾

While this is so, other factors have, however, changed, and quite remarkably at that. Generations of Malaysian youths have graduated through Malaysian universities with a high proportion of them being more conversant in the national language (Malay) than English. The Parliament, and later the courts, has taken to the national language without causing as much as a ripple. These and other public usage of the national language by Malaysians across the ethnic divide and from all walks of life have made Malay the *lingua franca* of modern Malaysia as it never was before. Its acceptance and standing is no longer a subject of dispute. The acceptance and the actual practice of the national culture, however, are more difficult to gauge if only its very concept is more nebulous. Nevertheless, if language is deemed to be, and accepted as, a significant part of culture, then Malaysia’s national culture can very well be said to have made a progressive stride in the past decades.

Public demonstrations of the trappings of the national culture in other spheres are also there for everyone to see. Malaysian diplomats of varied ethnic origins, for instance, would have little qualm in donning the national attire when and if the occasion calls for it and so is the case, one can say for TV newscasters, fluent as the latter are already in the national language. True these are but public happenings, but as maintained earlier, in matters of culture and in the context of a multi-ethnic society like Malaysia, it is neither wise nor practical to expect private lives of individual's to be transformed in any singular mould.

However, the real remarkable changes in Malaysia in the past decades occurred in the

economic sphere. Malaysia's economy underwent tremendous growth and this; it is argued in this concluding section of this paper, is by no means unrelated to the practice and perception of culture amongst the populace. With less than three decades since the beginning of the 1970s, Malaysia was transformed from a country producing mainly primary goods to one exporting predominantly manufactured products. The country, many believe, is already 'on its way to [a] high-tech future.'⁽²⁹⁾ This, naturally, has had a favourable impact on the New Economic Policy (1971-1991). The specific objective of restructuring society, though not fully achieved, was very much enhanced. At the beginning of the New Economic Policy, indigenous ownership of the equity of public companies was at mere 2%. Currently it is at 20.6%. Significantly the gain was not made at the expense of the Chinese, an important business community, but the foreign corporations.⁽³⁰⁾ In the same period of time, the number of indigenous professionals has increased five fold. Little wonder perhaps, the Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir, was game enough to quip in 1994 that 'Today, if a Mercedes or Rolls Royce is burnt in a riot, chances is it will belong to a *bumiputra* [indigene].'⁽³¹⁾

Riot, however, is not likely to be on the minds of many Malaysians nowadays. The American weekly magazine, *Time*, observes recently 'In today's Malaysia the ethnic anxieties of the post 1969 period seem distant. Mixed marriages are steeply on the rise, and some 60,000 Malay students currently attend Chinese language schools.'⁽³²⁾

What impact has the economic broad upswing on culture? If T.N. Harper is to be believed, the answer is rather obvious: 'the great struggles over language and culture had subsided somewhat in a general mood of pragmatism and prosperity.'⁽³³⁾ The pristine champions of culture might not want to take too easily to this kind of interpretation. It smacks too much of the abandonment of cultural high grounds in favour of lowly material pursuit. One need not necessarily, however, see things in this perspective. Culture, after all, is an ever changing phenomenon, certainly some aspects of it at least. It can never be totally unaffected by other factors. The initiative and fervent call towards the development of national culture, as seen in the earlier part of this paper, were made at a time when a significant section of the society felt itself to be grossly deprived in many areas. Once this imbalance has been ameliorated to a certain degree, one can expect,

though not guarantee that a new set of societal and cultural equilibrium would surface. The country's Prime Minister is prepared to concede that cultural liberalism, already very much a part of the Malaysian way of life, would gain further momentum in days ahead. In a recent interview he has said that it is not the government's policy to make all Malaysians hundred percent the same culturally, adding we 'accept that this is a multi-racial country. We should build bridges instead of trying to remove completely the barriers separating us.'⁽³⁴⁾

Nevertheless, bridge building can be made a lot easier if the barriers are not too numerous. It is the contention here that a number of policies pursued in Malaysia recently have helped removed some of the barriers, the less welcome ones. The way this was done, fortunately, has not resulted in the creation of new problems or fresh inter-ethnic suspicions. Amongst the more significant policies implemented have nothing to do with culture as such, which goes to say that the question of national culture in multi-ethnic Malaysia has to be viewed and understood in a much wider perspective. To try and present a part of this larger context is what this paper has attempted to do.

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2. See Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, **op. cit.** p.310.
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7. See for instance Ismail Hamid, **Masyarakat Dan Budaya Melayu**. (Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 1991) p: 213-218 and Rogayah Estar bt. Mohamed, ' Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan ' in Yusof Ismail & Khayati Ibrahim (eds.). **Dasar-Dasar Kerajaan Malaysia: Tinjauan Menyeluruh** (A.S. Noordeen, Kuala Lumpur, 1996) p: 40-52.
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15. **Parliamentary Debates on the Constitution Amendment Bill. 1971**. (Government Printers, Kuala Lumpur, 1972) p: 6.
16. See also Sinnadurai, **op.cit**- p: 48 and 49.
17. **Parliamentary Debates on the Constitution Amendment Bill 1971 , p: 7**
18. **Ibid.** p: 10 it ought to be noted that up to 1971 there still existed secondary schools that use English as the medium of instruction and, traditionally, it is from these schools that the country university students have originated.
19. See above
20. For articles of the **Rukunegara** see for instance G.P. Means, **op. cit.** p: 401.
21. Institut Tadbir Awam Negara, **op. cit.** p: 441.

22. Statement by the Parliamentary Secretary to the ministry of Information, **Parliamentary Report** 16 March 1971 as quoted in R. Kathigesu **Sejarah Perkembangan Televisyen Di Malaysia** (1963-1983) (Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 1994) p: 114-115.
23. Institut Tadbir Awam Negara, **op. cit.** p: 441.
24. **Ibid.**
25. See above
26. Ting Chew Peh, **op. cit.** p: 47

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qasim@salam.uitm.edu.my